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 RESUMEN: Los micro-fundamentos han emergido  de forma reciente como un tema de 
interés para la investigación en Dirección de Empresas. En este trabajo se ofrece una inter-
pretación  de su  significado e interés para la investigación. Se argumenta que su interés surge 
como consecuencia  de las limitaciones de las perspectivas macro, dominantes, con respecto 
a los desafíos organizativos y de dirección derivados de la producción basada en el cono-
cimiento. En el trabajo se presentan también otros fundamentos alternativos más adecuados 
para tratar estos problemas basados en la teoría goal-framing.  
Palabras clave: Microfundamentos, capacidades, producción basada en el conocimiento.
Clasificación JEL: M21
1. Introduction
«Micro-foundations» has emerged as an important theme in management 
research over the last five years or so. Thus, special issues have been explic-
itly1 or more implicitly2 devoted to the micro-foundations theme, it has figured 
prominently at the major management conferences, and an increasing number 
of papers grapple with micro-foundational issues. For example, in the strategic 
management field, scholars increasingly realize that understanding such issues 
as value appropriation (Coff, 1999; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a; Barney, 2001), 
resource value (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003b; Foss and Foss, 2005), strategy 
implementation (Barney, 2001), factor market dynamics (Makadok and Barney, 
2001), firm-level heterogeneity (Felin and Hesterly, 2006; Gavetti, 2005), and 
competitive dynamics (Teece, 2007) requires that substantial attention be paid to 
explanatory mechanisms that are located at the «micro-level» (Felin and Foss, 
2005; Abell, Felin and Foss, 2007). This suggests that the pursuit of micro-foun-
dations is not just about satisfying some formal, methodological requirement, but 
is undertaken to further the progress of a field.
The purpose of this article is to provide an informal introduction to some 
of the key micro-foundations themes. «Micro-foundations» are foundations 
of something, namely aggregate concepts and/or relations between aggregate 
variables. The very concept of micro-foundations arose in economics, where it 
was adopted as a label for self-conscious to merge micro and macro economics 
(Jaanssen, 2006), but is related to considerably older currents stressing «meth-
odological individualism», particularly Austrian economics thinking on meth-
odological issues (Menger, 1883). Austrians and other methodological individu-
alists (nowadays: virtually all economists and a few sociologists) insisted that 
aggregate concepts be reduced to their constituent components (i.e., individuals 
and their interaction) and were generally distrustful of aggregate theorizing, that 
1 Cf. the recent Journal of Management Studies Call for Papers for a special issue on «Micro-foun-
dations of Organizational Routines and Capabilities», http://www.bus.qut.edu.au/research/acbr/eirp/docu-
ments/SI_JMS_Microfoundations.pdf
2 Cf. the recent Strategic Management Journal Call for Papers for a special issue on «Pscyhological 
Foundations of Strategic Management», http://strategicmanagement.net/pdfs/SMJ_Special_Issues_Call_
for_Papers.pdf
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is, theorizing involving functional, and even worse, causal, relations between 
macro variables (Mises, 1949).
In order to make all this more concrete, I discuss micro-foundations in a 
specific context, namely that of the «knowledge and organizations» literature 
(Grandori and Kogut, 2002) aka the «knowledge movement» (Eisenhart and 
Santos, 2002). The choice is by no means arbitrary. The knowledge movement is 
a dominant analytical lens in contemporary management research. It is charac-
terized by macro-level explanation. And, yet it is one of the areas in management 
research where the need for a micro approach is most pressing: Organization and 
management for sustained value creation in knowledge-based production raises 
distinct challenges related to the provision of motivation and we are still rather 
in the dark concerning how to address those challenges, both theoretically and 
practically. I therefore end discussing some new micro-foundations that may be 
better capable of handling these challenges.
2.  Micro-foundations: What are They? And Why do Need Them?
2.1.  Micro-foundations, Reduction,
and Methodological Individualism
The micro-foundations project can be seen as an instance of «reduction-
ism.» By «reduction» is here understood the process of explaining a particular 
phenomenon in terms of more fundamental phenomena. By «reductionism» is 
understood the explanatory position that the best understanding of a complex, 
and in social science: collective-level, phenomenon «… should be sought at the 
level of structure, behaviour and laws of its component parts plus their relations» 
(Silberstein, 2002: 81). It entails a search for the «deep structure» underneath 
aggregate phenomena.
A fundamental question is where this deep structure is located, as there may 
be several analytical levels below a given aggregate phenomenon. Consider the 
phenomenon of competitive interaction. This can be seen as constituted by the 
actions of firms. In turn, those actions may be explainable in terms of the ac-
tions of individuals in firms. Often pragmatic considerations suggest that the 
relevant level to which we should reduce competitive interaction is the level of 
firms, while explanation directly in terms of individual decision-making is to be 
eschewed because it is too time-consuming— or otherwise resource-consuming. 
This may be a defensible procedure as long as we have good theories of how 
individual decision-making influence firm behaviour.
Whatever that exactly is, the example suggests that any theoretical (and con-
sequently empirical) effort to explain organizational and managerial phenomena 
(the explananda) has to make a choice (though the choice is often made only 
implicitly) that concerns the level at which explanation takes place, that is, the 
analytical level at which the important components of the explanans are located. 
Notably, for more than a hundred years, economics (e.g., Menger, 1883; Hayek 
1952; Arrow 1951; Dosi 1995), sociology (e.g., Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1970; 
Coleman 1990) and the philosophy of science (Popper, 1957) have witnessed a 
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debate as to whether individuals («micro») or social collectives («macro») have 
explanatory primacy. This debate has raged under the label of «methodologi-
cal individualism» versus «methodological collectivism.» The issue and debate 
carry very substantial theoretical and explanatory implications; for example, 
what are the relations between micro and macro levels? Do we always need to 
invoke micro-level explanatory mechanisms when trying to explain some macro-
level phenomenon? Is it legitimate to rely on aggregate constructs as part of 
the explanans⎯or, are these only present in the explanandum of an explanatory 
structure? Although it is surely possible to conceptually separate the method-
ological domain («How should theories be constructed and evaluated?») from 
the ontological («What exists in the world?), the issue and the debate also car-
ries substantial philosophical implications, and furthermore, very different phil-
osophical positions may be, and have been, invoked to defend the respective 
positions
Methodological individualism has been defended in numerous ways. For ex-
ample, it is sometimes defended by invoking a deeper argument of ontological 
individualism, according to which only individuals, and not collectives, are act-
ing entities. However, the argument here is rather epistemological. In line with 
reductionism, I take it to be the ultimate aim of scientific endeavours in the so-
cial science domain to identify and theorize the causal social mechanisms ⎯the 
«cogs and wheels» (Elster 1989: 3)⎯ that generate and explain observed as-
sociations between events. This view may also be associated with scientific and 
methodological realism (Psillos, 1999). It differs from the traditional covering-
law model of explanation of Carl Hempel and others, because the covering-law 
model does not imply an insistence on identifying genuine causality. In contrast, 
causality is central in a mechanisms approach. Thus, to the mechanism-oriented 
social scientist, the discovery of how human action and interaction causally pro-
duce collective level phenomena is what science is all about (e.g., Cowan and 
Rizzo, 1996). Micro-foundations as they relate to methodological individualism 
thus mean theorizing such micro-level causality.
2.2. Why Micro-foundations?
As argued there are compelling philosophical reasons why micro-foundations 
need to be provided for our theories. Further reasons why micro-foundations are 
critical for management may be called «alternative explanations», «managerial 
intervention, and «fundamental causes and predictability» (cf. Coleman, 1990: 
3-4).
Alternative explanations. A problem with macro-level explanation is that 
there are likely to be many alternative lower-level explanations of macro-level 
behaviour which cannot be rejected with macro-analysis alone. Even if a large 
sample can be constructed on the basis of macro units of analysis, a problem of 
alternative explanations may persist. As indicated above, alternative explanations 
at lower levels are readily apparent in, notably, the capabilities view, which seeks 
the explanation of differential firm performance in firm-level heterogeneity, that 
is, heterogeneous routines and capabilities. However, heterogeneity may be lo-
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cated at the individual level, notably when individuals self-select into particular 
firms (Felin & Hesterly, 2007).
Managerial intervention. An argument for the importance of understanding 
micro-foundations lies in the fundamental mandate of strategic management: 
to enable managers to gain and sustain competitive advantage. To achieve this, 
managerial intervention is required, which inevitably has to take place with an 
eye to the micro-level. For example, a correlation between collective culture 
and collective outcomes inherently tells the manager very little of what should 
be done to change culture. Similarly, it makes little sense to argue that manag-
ers can directly intervene on the level of, for example, capabilities. Perhaps, 
however, managers can influence capabilities, for example, by hiring key em-
ployees (in which case the micro-level is directly involved) or by changing 
overall recruitment policies, reward systems, etc., all of which involves the 
micro-level.
Fundamental causes and prescription. We cannot, we contend, conceive of 
«capabilities» absent an understanding of the individual actions and interactions 
that produce a capability. We may, again, in a shorthand manner think of capa-
bilities at t resulting from capabilities at t-1, but the above arguments indicate 
that such a macro-level explanation is rarely sufficiently fundamental. Coleman 
(1990: 3) convincingly argues that explanations that involve the micro level have 
the properties of being more stable, fundamental, and general than macro level 
explanations:
An explanation based on internal analysis [i.e., micro-foundations] of sys-
tem [organization] behaviour in terms of action and orientations of lower-level 
units is likely to be more stable and general than explanation which remains at 
the system level. Since the system’s behaviour is in fact resultant of the actions 
of its component parts, knowledge of how the actions of these parts combine 
to produce systematic behaviour can be expected to give greater predictability 
than will statistical relations of surface characteristics of the system.
To the extent that management is concerned not just with explaining past per-
formance but also with being prescriptive, Coleman’s point raises an important 
concern: The ability to predict is a condition for putting forward prescriptions. 
Micro-foundations are therefore an important part of strategic management as a 
prescriptive enterprise.
2.3. A General Model of Social Science Explanation
In order to clarify notions of «micro»/«individual level», and «macro»/«col-
lective level, as well as examine the relations between these notions and levels, 
consider Figure 1 which builds on the framework popularized by James Coleman 
(1990).
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Figure 1.—A General Model of Social Science Explanation
The figure makes a distinction between the macro-level and the micro-level. 
For example, it may be that the macro-level is organizational whilst the micro-
level is that of individuals. As shown, there are links between macro-macro (ar-
row 4) and macro-micro (arrow 1), micro-micro (arrow 2), and micro-macro 
(arrow 3).3 The figure also makes a distinction, perhaps more implicit, between 
what is to be explained (i.e., the explanandum) and its explanation (i.e., the ex-
planans). In social science, the aim usually is to explain either a macro-level 
phenomenon (located in the upper right hand corner of figure 1), such as a firm-
level outcome, or a link between macro-phenomena, as indicated by arrow 4. An 
example of the latter may be an observed correlation between the routines and 
the performance of firms in a population.
To explain and understand a particular phenomenon (such as overall firm per-
formance) the analyst makes use of theoretical mechanisms that are consistent 
with the arrows. Note that the arrows in Figure 1 are, from a theoretical perspec-
tive, empty boxes. They may be filled with different theoretical mechanisms, 
entirely dependent on theory development on the part of the analyst. For ex-
ample, consider using the Coleman framework to analyze the effects of corporate 
culture on firm performance (e.g., Schein, 1982; Barney, 1986), whilst providing 
micro-foundations for this link. Corporate culture is then the macro phenomenon 
placed in the upper left hand corner of figure 1, while firm performance is the 
macro outcome placed at the upper right hand corner. An attempt to explain, 
say, an observed close correlation between certain characteristics of corporate 
culture and firm performance should, from a micro-foundations perspective, in-
volve arrows 1, 2 and 3. However, many different explanatory accounts can be 
constructed. For example, in one such account, corporate culture can have the 
3 Hedström and Swedberg (1996: 296-8) refer to arrow 1, 2 and 3 as «situational», «individual ac-
tion», and «transformational» mechanisms, respectively.
4
3
2
1
«micro»
«macro»
Individual
action
Conditions
of individual
action
Social
outcomes
«Social 
facts» (e.g., 
institutions)
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function of credibly signalling to employees that if they invest in firm-specific 
human capital, they will be not be held up by management (cf. Kreps, 1990). 
This signal influences the incentives of employees to actually accumulate firm-
specific human capital (arrow 1). The result is that individual employees will ac-
tually undertake more such investments (arrow 2). The combined effect of each 
individual’s investment in human capital is that firm-level performance increases 
(arrow 3). In an alternative account, corporate culture functions, not as an incen-
tive device, but as a purely informational device that may improve the coordi-
nation of the actions of employees, leading to high firm-level productivity and 
possibly high financial performance. And in a third kind of account, corporate 
culture imparts meaning to a firm’s labour-management institutions which may 
also impact employee productivity and firm-specific investments, again leading 
to high firm-level productivity and performance (Rowlinson, 1993).
At first inspection, the framework depicted in Figure 1 would seem to for-
mally allow for explanation that takes place solely in terms of arrow 4, that 
is, explanatory accounts that are wholly located on the macro level. However, 
whether arrow 4 explanation is deemed legitimate depends on (ontological) cri-
teria related to an understanding of how the social world works (Mäki, 2001). 
Specifically, there are no conceivable causal mechanisms in the social world that 
operate solely on the macro level. There are no macro-level entities on the so-
cial domain that somehow possess capacities or dispositions to act (Cartwright, 
1989) that make them capable of directly producing macro-level outcomes and 
there are no processes of interaction between macro-entities that take place on 
this level. In short, there is no macro level causal mechanism that can be theoreti-
cally represented in terms of arrow 4.4 However, as we shall see, substantial parts 
of modern management research essentially reasons as if «arrow 4 explanation» 
was possible.
3.  Micro-Foundations and the «Knowledgment Movement»
3.1. The Knowledge Movement
The advent of «knowledge» as a central analytical lens in management re-
search over the last two decades is comparable in scope and impact to the be-
havorial approach in the 1950s and 1960s. The knowledge movement has swept 
across many of the major management fields, such as organization and strategic 
management, as well as international business research, strategic human resource 
management, and, of course, innovation studies and technology management. It 
has introduced new fundamental conceptualizations and analytical lenses (e.g., 
the «knowledge-based view of the firm», Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; 
Spender, 1996; Grant, 1996; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004); new constructs («ca-
4 Note that this point does not concern whether the explanandum can be placed on the macro level. 
Many (most) explananda in social science are placed at this level (Coleman, 1990: 2). 
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pabilities», whether «dynamic» or not, «competencies», «routines», «knowledge 
sharing», «knowledge integration», «absorptive capacity» etc.); new dimension-
alizations (e.g., Winter’s [1987] dimensions of knowledge assets); new measures 
(e.g., Heimeriks & Duysters, 2007); and, of course, new arguments relating to 
how knowledge-related constructs relate to firm-level outcomes (e.g., sustained 
competitive advantage, innovation, economic organization) (e.g., Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997).
3.2. Knowledge as EXPLANANS and EXPLANANDUM
The knowledge movement i, united in an overall conceptualization of (pri-
marily) the firm as the main locus of the development, application, and storage 
of productive knowledge, and this overall notion is arguably the coordinating 
insight in the knowledge movement. It is important to note that this function of 
the firm means more than simply the firm supplying an administrative frame-
work for the sourcing, organization and deployment of human capital inputs. It 
is central to many, perhaps most, contributions to the knowledge movement that 
knowledge can be distinctly organizational, that is, residing on supra-individual 
levels (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). Indeed, quite a lot of effort has been de-
voted to developing and defending the ontological status of such organizational 
knowledge (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996; 
and for the contrary view, Simon, 1991; Felin & Hesterly, 2007).
In turn, this conceptualization has helped to organize a sustained attempt 
to introduce in management research various knowledge-related constructs as 
determinants of mainly firm-level outcomes, and to introduce final and inter-
mediate knowledge-related outcome variables. In other words, the knowledge 
movement in management has expanded the set of explananda and explanantia 
in management. In terms of explanandum variables, researchers now routinely 
address organization-level knowledge sharing, integration, and creation as inter-
mediate and sometimes final outcome variables. For example, Tsai (2001) inves-
tigates how intra-organizational knowledge networks impact organization level 
knowledge sharing which in turn impact the combination and recombination of 
leading, leading to innovation (cf. also Hansen, 1999, 2002). In terms of knowl-
edge being part of the theoretical explanans in management research, scholars 
in management fields such as strategic management (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997; Makadok, 2001; Winter, 2001, 2003), strategic HRM (Wright, Dunford & 
Snell, 2001), and international business (Tallman, 2003) have been busy over the 
last one and a half decade building theory in which firm-level outcomes, such as 
competitive advantage and its possible sustainability and the boundaries of the 
firm, are explained in terms of capabilities. The notion of (firm-level) «absorp-
tive capacity», that is, the «ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge 
from the environment» (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) has given rise to an extremely 
influential line of research in which scholars have explained knowledge transfers, 
alliance performance, and, of course, innovation performance in terms of such 
absorptive capacity. In turn, absorptive capacity itself is sometimes addressed 
as an outcome variable and is then usually explained in terms of prior related 
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knowledge (Volberda, Foss & Lyles, 2010). Scholars also address explananda 
beyond the firm level in terms of capabilities (and similar constructs). For ex-
ample, Heimeriks and Duysters (2007) conceptualize «alliance capabilities» and 
theorize their impact on alliance performance. Foss and Eriksen (1995) concep-
tualized capabilities at the industry level.
The dominant thrust of all this is to reduce virtually all knowledge-related an-
tecedents to firm-level experience (that has somehow emerged from local search 
processes). The notion of firm-level experience (and hence capability) unites a 
number of the central sources of the knowledge movement, notably behavioral-
ism and the emphasis on locally held experiential knowledge. As such it may 
well be the central analytical notion of the knowledge movement.
3.3. Tools, Tasks and Members
One take on all this is to recognize with McGrath and Argote (2001) that 
knowledge in organizations reside in multiple reservoirs.5 Specifically, McGrath 
and Argote distinguish between «tools», «tasks» and «members.» Tools may be 
exemplified by ITC (but more generally by all sorts of «embodied capital»), 
while tasks relate to discrete activities, and members are of course individuals 
in organizations. The authors further note that the three knowledge reservoirs 
may be combined or crossed to form sub-networks, so that, for example, the 
members-tasks mapping represents the organization’s division of labor, while the 
members-members mapping represents its network structure and the tasks-tasks 
mapping leads to routines (and per implication the various constructs that are 
derived from the routine construct), while the member-task-tool mapping links 
specific individuals to specific tasks working with specific tools.
In terms of the relevance of the McGrath and Argote classification for un-
derstanding research strategies in the knowledge movement, much effort⎯often 
very managerially oriented⎯has been spent on examining the role of ITC in 
knowledge management. This effort is, however, limited to the fields of infor-
matics and knowledge management. Much effort has also been spent on con-
ceptualizing the task-task network as a reservoir of knowledge ⎯namely in the 
enormous modern literature on capabilities, routines, etc.⎯, and this effort has 
had a broad impact on a large set of fields in management research. The explora-
tion of the members-members mapping has recently become a growth industry 
in management research, partly driven by fundamental advances in the sociol-
ogy of networks. However, as I shall argue, surprisingly little effort has been 
devoted to a research strategy that begins from members (i.e., individuals). Thus, 
in the following I elaborate on extant research heuristics within the knowledge 
movement.
5 Not all agree with this reservoir metaphor. In particular, Nonaka has been critical of it (e.g., Nonaka, 
Toyama & Hirata, 2008).
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3.4. Heuristic I: «Capabilities First»
Based on behavioral organization theory and evolutionary economics, the 
«capabilities first» approach to theory building in the knowledge movement 
clearly works off of strong ideas, and there are no doubt good reasons for its 
strong influence, even dominance, in a number of fields in management research. 
Contributors to the «capabilities first» stream of research argue that productive 
knowledge uniquely resides in routines and capabilities, perhaps supported by 
«higher-order organizing principles» and «identity» (Kogut & Zander, 1992, 
1996). This places the locus of knowledge unambiguously at the collective (firm) 
level, in effect sidestepping the level of individuals and their interaction (Felin 
& Hesterly, 2007). This approach has become extremely influential, particularly 
in strategic management and organization theory, and has given rise to an ac-
cumulating body of empirical research (Hoopes & Madsen, 2008). It represents 
a strong tendency to take macro variables or constructs, such as capabilities, 
routines, absorptive capacity, etc., as explanatory primitives.
From the perspective of micro-foundations, this is unsatisfactory: One does 
not need to subscribe to hardcore methodological individualism to grant that 
collective notions in social science should have micro-foundations, that there 
simply aren’t any mechanisms that directly link macro variables, and that links 
between such variables should therefore be modeled as being mediated by micro 
variables, notably variables that capture individual actions and interactions (Fe-
lin & Foss, 2005). The absence of such foundations in the knowledge movement 
has more pragmatic implications. It means that the notion of capabilities (as well 
as related notions) is highly fuzzy: Capabilities are probably best understood as 
latent variables, but what exactly are the indicator variables that we might want 
to include when thinking about and trying to measure capabilities? Moreover, 
capabilities are clearly outcomes of micro-level knowledge-related behaviors, 
such as knowledge sharing and integration behaviors, but these are usually black-
boxed in the capabilities first approach. As a result, it is not clear which manage-
rial interventions may serve to create or change capabilities.
The bottomline is that while capabilities may be useful shorthand for compli-
cated patterns of individual action and coordinated interaction, the capabilities 
first approach is badly in need of a micro-foundation. That it does not have one 
may have to do with its history of emergence in evolutionary economics and 
primarily serving as a sort of underpinning of the firm-level heterogeneity. If that 
is the primary purpose, one can ⎯perhaps⎯ treat micro-foundations in a more 
cavalier manner. However, for management purposes dispensing with individu-
als is hardly satisfactory; after all, as Barnard (1938) insisted management begins 
always and everywhere with the individual.
3.5. Heuristic II: «Networks First»
Over the last decade, arguments derived from sociological network theory 
have become prominent in management research, perhaps partly stimulated by 
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their affinity with social capital arguments which had become influential slightly 
earlier (Ghoshal & Tsai, 1998; Ghoshal and Nahapiet, 1998). As defined by Tsai 
and Ghoshal (1998: 464), «»Social capital encompasses many aspects of a social 
context, such as social ties, trusting relations, and value systems that facilitate 
actions of individuals located within that context.» In a highly influential paper 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) discuss the structural (ties), the relational (trust), 
and the cognitive (values) dimensions of social capital. It is implied in this that 
social capital serves as a resource to individuals and firms because of its benefi-
cial effects on the motivation, ability, and opportunity of individuals. Obviously, 
this is a large number of functions to burden a single construct with, and it raises 
suspicions that perhaps «social capital» suffers from the same basic problem 
that beset the notion of capabilities: A too heavy explanatory burden is arguably 
placed upon it!
Characteristically, significant analytical progress has been made by consider-
ing only one of the possible dimensions of social capital, typically the «structural» 
dimension. Much of this work has taken place in the context of knowledge shar-
ing and creation. Attention has centered on explaining how intra-organizational 
channels of communication positively mediate the relation between knowledge 
and outcomes such as product innovation (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998; Hansen 1999; 
Ahuja, 2000; Tsai 2001; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Hansen, Løvas & Mors, 
2005).
This literature begins from the central knowledge management tenet that by 
sharing knowledge, units in a network (e.g., employees in an intra-organizational 
network) can obtain advantages in the form of knowledge that can be used to 
enhance work performance (increased productivity and/or innovations). This 
idea is then placed in the context of sociological network approaches, whether 
in the tradition from Granovetter (1973) or Burt (1992), which makes it pos-
sible to build hypotheses regarding how knowledge sharing and the advantages 
it may cause are related to various structural properties of individuals’ positions 
in knowledge networks.
Following Burt (1992: 80) who proposed «… to leap over the motivation is-
sue by taking […] a player’s network as simultaneously an indicator of entrepre-
neurial opportunity and motivation», the literature in general takes motivation to 
be wholly endogenous to position.6 While the networks first approach, in contrast 
to the capabilities first approach, explicitly takes individuals into account, these 
individuals are often treated as mere temporary occupants of the positions that 
are of real interest in this approach. In other words, the networks first approach 
offers an impoverished account of individuals in which, for example, little atten-
tion is paid to heterogeneity across individuals. Such «thin» microfoundations 
may, however, fail to capture vital explanatory mechanisms on the micro level. 
Thus, Reinholt, Petersen and Foss (2010) argue that insights in motivation need 
to be integrated with network measures to better understand knowledge sharing 
6 This also implies that position itself is seldom examined as endogenous to the choices of 
individuals.
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in organizations. In a nutshell, we forward that while network position may de-
termine an individual’s opportunities to access new knowledge, it is only when 
she is adequately motivated to act on such opportunities that knowledge acquisi-
tion in fact occurs. If in fact motivation was wholly endogenous to position, this 
reasoning would obviously be redundant. However, there is strong evidence that 
employees differ in their motivation to engage in knowledge sharing (Cabrera 
& Cabrera, 2005), and that such motivation can be influenced by, for example, 
organizational design variables (Osterloh & Frey, 2000) and HRM policies (Ca-
brera, Collins & Salgado, 2006). This evidence suggests that motivation is not 
fully endogenous to network position.
3.6. Heuristic III: «Individuals First»
Whereas the capabilities first strategy suppresses individuals and the networks 
first strategy works with a very thin notion of individuals, the «individuals first» 
strategy to be discussed here begins from explicit assumptions about individuals, 
and tries to build to organizational level knowledge-related outcomes from such 
a starting point. Though dominant in economics and rational choice sociology, 
and of course related to the psychologist’s starting point in the individual, the 
individuals first approach is decidedly a minority position in those parts of man-
agement that have been particularly influenced by the knowledge movement, 
such as strategic management and international business. An important early 
statement of the individuals first approach is Grant (1996) (drawing on Simon, 
1991), who is explicitly critical of the notion of «organizational knowledge», 
points out that this construct suppresses the «mechanisms through which this 
‘organizational knowledge’ is created through the interactions of individuals» 
(p.113), and endorses an approach that emphasizes the «role of the individual in 
storing and creating knowledge» (p.112). Other examples are Zenger’s (1994) 
agency theoretic exploration of the incentives confronted by knowledge workers; 
Argote’s (1999) individual-based exploration of organizational learning; Oster-
loh and Frey’s (2000) motivational psychology-based exploration of the capacity 
of alternative organizational set-ups to foster knowledge sharing; Gottschalg and 
Zollo’s (2007) linking of motivational assumptions about individuals, organiza-
tional incentives, and competitive advantage; and Rothaermel and Hess’ (2007) 
sophisticated multi-level exploration of innovation capabilities.
3.7.  Why the Macro Bias in the Knowledge Movement is 
Problematic
Hitherto, research in the knowledge movement has been at least strongly 
influenced, and more likely dominated, by approaches that while not entirely 
neglecting individuals and their interaction, typically focus the main attention 
on supra-individual antecedents when seeking to account for firm-level firm-
related outcomes (i.e., innovation, firm-level knowledge sharing, integration, and 
creation). In different ways and to different degrees, this is exemplified by both 
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the capabilities first and the networks first research strategies. The existence of a 
macro bias is increasingly documented by bibliometric findings. Heimeriks, Fe-
lin, Foss and Zollo (2010) analyze a very significant part of the knowledge move-
ment, that is, 4,766 papers published in 29 top journals from 1980-2009. Based 
on a keyword analysis, they conclude that a macro bias indeed exists. Volberda, 
Foss and Lyles, 2010) examine the entire absorptive capacity literature (or, at 
least, all those papers that reference the founding Cohen & Levinthal [1990] 
paper), and conclude that individuals are very seldom part of the explanatory 
structure of this literature. Finally, based on a study of 100 key contributions to 
the knowledge management literature, Foss, Husted and Michailova (2010) show 
that even this literature suffers from a macro bias.
This bias is unfortunate because knowledge work and knowledge-based pro-
duction in general raise particular organizational and management challenges: 
Processes like knowledge sharing, creating, and integrating involve behaviors 
that are particularly difficult to measure and reward (Holmström, 1989), as both 
input and output measures may be very noisy. Moreover, an increasingly robust 
finding in empirical research is that explicit performance pay may crowd out the 
intrinsic motivation that is arguably critical to much knowledge work (Osterloh 
& Frey, 2000; Cabrea & Cabrera, 2005; Reinholt, Petersen & Foss, 2010).
Conventional wisdom in strategic management holds that the dominant 
sources of competitive advantage are knowledge assets that are built over time 
through processes of creating, integrating and sharing knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). How-
ever, these processes are critically dependent on the exercise of intelligent efforts 
by knowledge specialists, often in response to rapidly changing contingencies. 
Because they are fundamentally dependent on individual behaviors, discretion, 
and judgment, and an interaction, they are, however, suppressed by the extan t 
macro bias. Theories that highlight routines, capabilities, etc. as the fundamen-
tal analytical unit are virtually silent about the exercise of intelligent effort and 
about the motivational requirements of knowledge-based production.
Ultimately, what is required to understand the emergence, change, mainte-
nance, etc. of knowledge-based value creation and appropriation is an «individu-
als first» heuristic that can handle the specific organizational and management 
challenges introduced by knowledge-based production (Felin & Foss, 2005). 
However, the existing repertoire of cognitive and motivational assumptions in 
management research is inadequate for dealing with these challenges.
This repertoire has been borrowed from very different sources, notably the 
economics model of man and behavioralism in its various forms. Theories 
based on the economics model of man, notably principal-agent theory and other 
theories of economic organization, may represent excellent conceptualizations 
of many of the basic management and organizational problems connected to 
knowledge-based production. However, they typically offer very little concrete 
guidance with respect to handling these problems. Moreover, to the extent that 
the understanding of intelligent, adaptive behaviors is a necessary part of micro-
foundations for the knowledge movement, research may not be best served by 
behavioralism and its various offshoots. In behavioral models, agents are hard-
wired to choose certain courses of actions, and it is therefore difficult to handle 
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judgment, discretion, etc.7 Moreover, behavioralism in management has had dif-
ficulties coming to grips with motivation which is often black-boxed (as in Nel-
son & Winter, 1982).
In the following I sketch one recent approach that do not suffer from these 
problems, namely goal-framing theory as it applies to knowledge-based produc-
tion. This approach is explicitly evolutionary, but builds off from «real» evolu-
tionary theory (e.g., evolutionary anthropology, Dunbar, 2003) rather than from 
analogies to evolution; is fundamentally based on bounded rationality, but makes 
much more of it than economics and management theory in general do; and treats 
cognition and motivation in a unified manner, namely by means of the notion of 
a goal-frame.
4.  Organizing and Managing Knowledge-Based Production
4.1.  Joint Production
Foss and Lindenberg (2010) argue, based on Lindenberg (2003) that the key 
problem in any organization is how intelligent, adaptive effort can be mobilized 
by motivational and cognitive means to contribute to joint production and there-
fore high levels of sustained value creation. We draw on converging research in 
different fields (i.e., social psychology, evolutionary anthropology, cognitive sci-
ence, and cognitive sociology) to build a «goal-framing theory of the firm» that 
identifies the motivational and cognitive mechanisms that underlie sustainable 
value creation. The key insight in this theory is that the management of motiva-
tion is largely the management of cognitions.
The key construct in the theory is «joint production.» By joint production 
we mean any productive activity that involves heterogeneous but complemen-
tary resources, task and outcome interdependences, and, importantly, where the 
participants recognize a joint value creating endeavor, and see themselves as 
part of this endeavor. Human beings have been especially equipped by evolution 
for participating in joint production with intelligent effort. The ability for joint 
production is what created the adaptive advantage of human beings living in 
larger groups, and it seems that the human brains has evolved as a «social brain», 
basically to allow us to realize these adaptive advantages (Dunbar, 2003). Appar-
ently, the brain contains a hardwired ability to perceive a situation as one of joint 
production and to trigger the special motivation to participate in joint production 
(cf. Sebanz et al., 2006). People then see themselves and others as contributors to 
joint production, with each its own role (tasks and responsibilities). However, the 
motivation for contributing to joint production cannot be generated by appeals 
to self-interest with interest alignment (principal-agent theory) or appeals to do-
7 It is perhaps not surprising that a leading scholar who is strongly influenced by behaviorialism, 
namely Winter (2003), relegates decision making that is not based on routines, etc. to the category of «ad 
hoc problem-solving» ⎯which seems to place it outside the orbit of systematic inquiry. However, for the 
purposes of building an understanding of intelligent, adaptive behavior this is hardly a viable approach.
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cility («fiat», transaction cost economics), but requires its own distinct levers. 
These are of a cognitive nature.
4.2. Goal Frames
A key feature of cognitive processes is that they are selective (Posner & Pe-
terson 1990). Specifically, cognitive processes take place in functionally special-
ized modules, some of which are hardwired (e.g., face recognition) and some 
of which are learned (e.g., word recognition). Social life requires flexible and 
inclusive modules. Such modules are activated by overarching (or «high-level») 
goals. When goals are activated and therefore focal they «frame» a situation in 
the sense that they inhibit other goals (see Shah et al., 2002) and govern what we 
attend to—that is, what concepts and chunks of knowledge are being activated; 
what alternatives are being considered; what information one is most sensitive 
about; and how the information is being processed (Kruglanski & Köpetz, 2009). 
For example, persons whose major focal goal is to improve their status position 
in an organization will be highly sensitive to information about opportunities and 
difficulties to do so; of their store of causal knowledge they will have only acti-
vated what pertains to reaching this goal; they will be also oriented towards the 
longer term, and are likely to focus on behavioral alternatives that advance their 
status position to various degrees. Opportunities pertaining to other high-level 
goals (such as «behaving appropriately» in the service of joint production) are 
likely to be more or less ignored unless they overlap with opportunities for the 
status goal. A goal-frame denotes a high-level goal together with the cognitive 
processes that are framed by this goal.8 Consider the three overarching goals in 
more detail.
The normative goal frame. This goal-frame is the heart of the motivation for 
joint production: In the normative goal-frame the goal is to improve what is good 
for the collective, by focusing on what behavior would be appropriate, whether in 
terms of contributing to a joint project or of what is expected or exemplary. Thus, 
the important aspects of a situation are normative in the sense that one is sensi-
tive to «oughts» according to self or others, sensitive to what one observes other 
people do, and sensitive to what might be needed to be done, such as sharing 
knowledge with other employees. Intelligent effort is put into furthering collec-
tive goals. Goals having to do with the way one feels or with personal resources 
are pushed into the cognitive background, suspending opportunism to various 
degrees. Thus, if one can make people see a situation as a joint project, they will 
8 Overarching goals can be activated in a number of ways but often they are triggered by cues in the 
environment. For example, Liberman, Samuels and Ross (2004) found that labeling a social dilemma 
game as the «Community Game» (suggesting a context with group-related decisions and an emphasis 
on appropriateness) versus labeling it as the «Wall Street Game» (suggesting a context with gain-related 
competitive decisions) made a huge difference in the relative frequency of cooperative responses (66% vs. 
31%). Presumably, the label acted as a cue that triggered normative or a gain goal together with the linked 
chunks of knowledge, criteria, etc.
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contribute considerably more to a collective good than people for whom the situ-
ation is mainly about how they feel («hedonic») or for whom it is mainly about 
gaining something.
The gain goal frame. Economics takes this the gain goal-frame to be the 
only relevant goal-frame for human beings; in goal-framing theory, it is one of 
the three over-arching goal frames. When people are mindful of improving (or 
preventing deterioration of) their resources (e.g., status and money), they are 
oriented towards the middle or long-term, and the criteria for goal realization are 
improvements in these personal resources. Such a goal-frame will make people 
highly sensitive to opportunities for and threats to the improvement of their re-
sources, and thus particularly sensitive to incentive instruments. For example, in 
such a goal-frame individuals will react strongly to advancement schemes, are 
willing to invest in education if returns are reasonably certain, will be competi-
tive with regard to advancement, etc.9
The hedonic goal frame. Enjoyment has long been considered a powerful 
source of motivation, including work motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). When 
people are oriented in a hedonic manner, their major goal is to improve how they 
feel in a particular situation, such as seeking direct improvement in self-esteem, 
seeking excitement, and avoiding unpleasant effort, avoiding negative thoughts 
and events, avoiding direct uncertainty. The time horizon of this hedonic goal-
frame is very short and the criteria for having realized the goal are related to 
improvements in the way one feels. The great power of this goal-frame vis-à-vis 
rival goal-frames derives from its direct link to emotions (Ryan, Huta & Deci, 
2008). If a person is put into a hedonic goal-frame by a cue that triggers it, the 
modularity of the frame will also make that person hedonic with respect to many 
other things; there is a cross-domain effect.
4.3. Motivation Management for Joint Production
What do these goal-frames mean for the governance for the establishment 
and maintenance of knowledge-based joint production in firms? The obvious 
answer might be that firms need to sustain a normative goal-frame. However, 
the normative goal frame is inherently precarious. Apparently, human evolution 
has created an unequal strength between the normative and the other two goal-
frames. From an evolutionary point of view, the ultimate success is reproduction 
of the individual, and therefore it is likely that individual concerns have had an 
adaptive advantage over concerns of the collective. Without supports, the norma-
tive goal-frame is the weakest of the three goal-frames.
9 An important contribution of organizational economics is to show that 1) agents in a gain goal-
frame may be tempted to behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1985: 47), 2) opportunism is not com-
patible with joint production, and 3) opportunism can only be ameliorated, and not entirely checked, by 
schemes of interest alignment, allocations of property rights, and adoption of certain contract law regimes 
(Holmström, 1979; Williamson, 1985).
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The relevant supports are structural design, reward management and rela-
tional signaling. Here is a brief list of some of these supports (more detail in 
Lindenberg & Foss, 2010):
Authority. While authority is an unavoidable aspect of firms, it may have 
negative motivational consequences. One way to mitigate the negative aspects of 
fiat is to have flat organizations. However, in larger and more complex organiza-
tions, this cannot be done. The solution is to find a way to legitimize hierarchy 
so that it is compatible with joint production. This can be done in terms of the 
various functions that have to be fulfilled and in terms of the necessary informa-
tion, knowledge, and responsibilities that cumulate in certain functions (Adler & 
Borys, 1996; Lindenberg, 1993). A directive is then not the order of a superior, 
but the knowledge-based wish of somebody higher up in the hierarchy. It is func-
tional to follow the directive of somebody who is better able to judge what best 
serves joint production in this particular case.
Rewards. While employees need to be rewarded individually in order to 
maintain the motivation to engage in certain activities, it is not obvious how they 
should be rewarded, as status advancement and money may foster a gain goal-
frame and conditions that increase enjoyment of work may foster a hedonic goal-
frame. Both effects can work against a sustainable normative goal-frame. How-
ever, a normative goal-frame can be supported by gain (e.g., promotion chances) 
and hedonic rewards (e.g., social approval) for behavior that contributes to joint 
production. Negative sanctions (financial or symbolic) for not contributing are 
likely to be legitimate in a context of joint production and will also strengthen the 
normative goal frame, if the behavior can be monitored correctly (Fehr & Rock-
enbach, 2003). In sum, hedonic, financial, career, personal development, sym-
bolic, or task rewards can strengthen the normative goal frame from the back-
ground if they clearly signal recognition for contributions to joint production.
Relational signaling. Managers can signal their commitment to joint pro-
duction in various ways. Rewards in a firm committed to joint production will 
be couched in terms of recognition. But since recognition is at the same time a 
signal that one cares for the relationship, the functioning of the reward system is 
closely tied to the workings of relational signalling. People are generally aware 
that these commitments must be generated by goal-frames that may or may not 
be stable. The «right» orientation in this sense signifies relative lack of strate-
gic behavior. For this reason, employees will interpret the organization’s actions 
towards employees as relational signals, as signs of the «true» orientation (a 
normative goal-frame).
Strategic «as if» relational campaigns that actually only try to create the ap-
pearance of relational concern and concern for individual improvement, will not 
be effective for long and will ultimately cost the organization dearly in terms of 
lost reciprocal commitment of employees. One can say that the commitments 
to individual improvement and relational quality must be continuously signaled 
by the organization, including in those cases where there is bad news. If reor-
ganization is necessary, then it is even more necessary to communicate openly, 
show commitment to fairness, etc. Relational commitment of the central orga-
nization also shows up in how management goes about repairing relationships 
when something did go wrong (see Dirks, Lewicki & Zaheer, 2009). In turn, 
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employees signal their relational commitment to the organization by how they 
exert intelligent effort for the realization of the firm’s goals. In sum, much of the 
governance in the daily interactions in an organization is equal to the exchange 
of relational signals.
5. Conclusions
Micro-foundations have emerged as an important foundational theme in re-
cent management research. The interest in micro-foundations have arisen per-
haps mainly as a consequence of perceived shortcomings of extant, dominant 
macro perspectives with respect to coming to grips with key management and 
organizational challenges related to knowledge-based production. Moreover, mi-
cro-foundations link to the currently fashionable emphasis on multi-level theory 
(Dansereau & Yammarino, 2005), because micro-foundations inherently involve 
considering at least two levels of analysis. As Gupta, Tesluk and Taylor (2007: 
889) point out a purpose of micro-foundations (although they do not use this 
terminology) is to «… clearly articulate how concepts at higher levels of analysis 
emerge from lower level entities and interaction.»
Although numerous arguments can be amassed in favor of the micro-foun-
dations project, there is also an issue about walking the talk: Calling for micro-
foundations is the easy part; building those foundations is much harder. There are 
several reasons for this.
First, if the aim is to build micro-foundations for aggregate construct, the task 
is complicated by there often being many different dimensions and aspects to such 
constructs. For example, consider the notion of routines. Routines is a label for 
a number of different phenomena that only seem to share the property that they 
refer to some repetitiveness of sequentially taken actions among a group of people 
(there does not seem to be any definitional requirement that these must be employ-
ees). Other than that, routines may vary in numerous dimensions. Routines may 
be codified or tacit. They can be characterized in the performative or the ostentive 
dimension. They may be flexible or highly inflexible. Etc. (see Becker, 2004). It is 
quite likely that micro-foundations for routines differ as a function of such dimen-
sions. For example, in one characterization routines are like standard operating 
procedures, that is, explicit and rigid (Cyert & March, 1963). They are likely to 
require monitoring to make sure that behaviors are in conformity with the routine. 
In another characterization (e.g., Feldman & Pentland, 2005), routines are flex-
ible, adaptive, and even seems to involve a certain amount of playfulness. Routine 
behavior may here be more self-sustaining as intrinsic motivation is involved. In 
other words, motivational micro-foundations differ between the two characteriza-
tions. Moreover, there are different explanatory aspects of routines, such as their 
emergence, maintenance and change. Again, it is likely that what are appropriate 
micro-foundations for routines differ as a function of such different aspects; for 
example, the micro-foundations of the emergence of routines likely differ from the 
micro-foundations of the maintenance of routines. 
Second, multi-level theory is quite simply more complex to build than mono-
level theory. Links between levels are many and complicated. For example, ag-
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gregating from individuals to organization in the context of networks is complex 
as it must inherently involve how individuals are structured in terms of den-
sity and centrality. However, examples of very successful multi-level theories, 
founded on clear micro-foundations, certainly exist. Transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985, 1996) comes to mind as a prominent example.
Third, because management research draws from so many sources and ad-
dresses so many different problems, there are no clear, unambiguous behavioral 
models that command universal assent. There is, therefore, many degrees of free-
dom with respect to the choice of behavioral (micro-)foundations. However, as 
I have argued, this does not mean that anything goes. A key problem that cuts 
across a number of management fields is that of one understanding the manage-
ment and organization of knowledge-based (joint) production. I have argued that 
our existing theories are inadequate for coming to grips with this because they 
only consider parts of the problem. The goal-framing theory of the firm has the 
potential to consider the problem in its entirety.
Finally, while ultimately there are strong philosophical reasons for beginning 
analysis at the micro-level (Felin & Foss, 2005; Felin & Hesterly, 2007), a micro-
foundations project increases its chances of general acceptance and diffusion in 
the relevant research communities if novel consequences for aggregate phenom-
ena can be predicted and demonstrated (Stinchcombe, 1991). For example, stra-
tegic management scholars should not pursue more micro-oriented research for 
the sake of satisfying abstract calls for methodological individualism per se, but 
because insight in, for example, endogenous preferences, biases in bargaining 
situations, solidarity norms, etc. impact value appropriation and value creation, 
and because how successfully firms deal with these micro-level issues may un-
derlie competitive advantages (Argote, 1999). Indeed, an increasing number of 
studies now exist that demonstrate novel aggregate consequences of explicitly 
micro-foundational assumptions, and do so in the context of knowledge-based 
production (e..g, Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008; Linden-
berg & Foss, 2010). There is therefore ground for optimism on behalf of the 
micro-foundations project.
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